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CHAPTER 1 
Irregular Migration and Human Smuggling from Asia and Africa to Europe 
 
International migration has intensified during the last two decades both across the 
East to West and the South to North axis: Europe has been receiving increasing 
numbers of migrants from developing countries in Africa and Asia (and also Latin 
America).  
 
Figure 1. 1 Estimated number of international migrants by major area, 1990-
2010 (millions) 
 
 
  Source: UN ESA 2008, p.2 
 
Part of this international movement of people takes place illegally, notably involves 
either unlawful border crossings or overstaying (with or without visa). This books 
looks at one specific aspect of the wider irregular migration phenomenon, notably the 
organization and role of migrant smuggling networks in aiding irregular migration 
from Asia and Africa to southern Europe (and from southern European countries to 
the wider EU area). It also discusses how migration control policies in southern 
European countries may inadvertently shape the migrant smuggling phenomenon and 
the smuggling ‘business’. 
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The book is inscribed in the wider literature on migrant smuggling and irregular 
migration while it also briefly touches upon the question of trafficking in human 
beings to the extent that migrant smuggling sometimes involves labour trafficking 
(notably the labour exploitation of the smuggled migrants under conditions that 
approximate modern day slavery). A detailed overview of the routes and modalities of 
migrant smuggling actors the Mediterranean is provided. Moreover, both the 
‘business’ and social-cultural aspects of the phenomenon are analyzed in the chapters 
that follow. 
 
The book is based on extensive empirical research (about 150 qualitative interviews 
with migrants, smugglers, state actors and civil society stakeholders), participant 
observation, collection of statistical data, desk research) as regards the smuggling of 
migrants from Africa and Asia to Greece (via North Africa and Turkey) and on 
recently published studies, statistics and qualitative data on migrant smuggling from 
Africa (sub Saharan and North Africa) to Spain and Italy. 
 
This introductory chapter presents the theoretical and empirical context within which 
the book is placed and also the geopolitical and policy context within which migrant 
smuggling develops. In the following section we discuss the two dominant 
perspectives in analyzing migrant smuggling and discuss their relevance for the study 
of the smuggling of irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Africa and Asia to 
Europe. We also offer here a first overview of the irregular migration flows towards 
southern European countries with a view to highlighting the size of the phenomenon 
and in particular the relevance of human smuggling within the wider context of 
irregular migration and asylum seeking. Section Three discusses the EU policy on 
irregular migration with a view to offering the framework within which to consider 
the related policies of Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece discussed in Chapters 2-6 in 
more detail. This chapter already traces the contours of the human smuggling 
phenomenon and how it develops as a response to a mismatch between migration 
pressures (from East and South) and (the lack of legal) migration opportunities (in 
West and North) in the wider Mediterranean region and beyond. The chapter 
concludes with a short presentation of the contents of the book. 
 
 
2. Irregular Migration and Human Smuggling 
 
According to the most recent United Nations Development Report (UNDP 2009, 
p.21) it is currently estimated that around 214 million individuals are international 
migrants, representing some 3.1 percent of the world’s population (see also IOM 
2008, p. 2). Thus international migrants represent a rather small fraction of the 
world’s population. Still it is interesting to note that the percentage of international 
migrants is estimated to have doubled in the last 25 years even if the share of 
international migrants in the world’s populations has risen only by 50% - in other 
words international migrants are 2.5 times more today compared to 1970 but they 
account for approx. 3% of the total world’s population (as opposed to approx. 2% in 
1970).  
 
Table 1.1: International (documented and irregular) migrants (in millions), 
worldwide, 1970-2010 
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                            Source: ICHRP 2010, p.11 
 
 
Of course such gross numbers should be read with caution as migration statistics 
differ widely between countries even simply within the European Union let alone in 
global scale. Different countries have different naturalization laws and hence may 
convert migrants to citizens and make them disappear statistically from the country. 
In addition some countries count the foreign born and not just the foreigners giving a 
fuller picture of migration trends (Triandafyllidou, Gropas and Vogel, 2007). The 
above problems show that global data on legal international migration may not be 
accurate. Such problems are even greater when seeking to estimate the size of 
irregular migration, as it is a non registered phenomenon, by definition. 
 
The United Nations has estimated that globally there are approximately 30 to 40 
million irregular migrants, a number that amounts to between 15 and 20 percent of all 
international migrants (ICHRP 2010, p.13, estimation refers to 2003). Naturally this is 
just an estimate. Data on undocumented migrants are usually derived from national 
censuses that although comprehensively counting both legal and irregular migrants, 
are not likely to capture the total size of the irregular migration as undocumented 
residents tend to hide from census interviewers by fear of detection. 
 
For the European Union, the CLANDESTINO Project has produced in 2008 a 
scientifically rigorous calculation estimating irregular migrant residents in the 27 
member states of the EU at 1.9–3.8 million (Vogel et al. 2009) in a total of approx. 
498 million inhabitantsi in the EU, i.e. below 1% of the total population. According to 
van Hook et al. (2005), undocumented migrants in the USA were estimated to be 10.3 
million in 2005 (in a total populationii of 307 million on 2009, i.e. just over 3% of the 
total US population). According to Koser (2007), p.57-59), the percentage of irregular 
migration among total movements in Asia and Latin America might be beyond 50%. 
The above estimates show that irregular migration is a phenomenon of global 
concern. It has attracted much attention in Europe too by policy makers, the media 
and scholars, even though the political importance given to it may be 
disproportionately high compared to the overall percentage of irregular migrants 
within the total population (below 1% in 2008). 
 
  Migrants Total Population World % 
1970 81,3 3 696 2.2 
1975 86,8 3 696 2.1 
1980 99,3 4 442 2.2 
1985 111 4 844 2.3 
1990 154,9 5 280 2.9 
1995 165,1 5 692 2.9 
2000 176,7 6 086 2,9 
2005 190,6 6 465 3,1 
2010 213,9 6 793 3,1 
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Naturally not all undocumented migrants have been smuggled into a country. The 
data given above are meant to put our study into its global context and give a sense of 
the size of the phenomena that we are studying. Below we shall first provide for 
working definitions and clarify how the terms ‘human smuggling’, ‘migrant 
smuggling’ or ‘human trafficking’ and ‘trafficking in human beings’ are used in the 
book. We shall thus identify the links between irregular migration, asylum seeking 
and human smuggling as well as trafficking. These clarifications provide for the 
necessary framework for our analysis of the empirical data in the chapters that follow. 
 
2.1 Terms and definitions 
 
In the world of nation states where borders are fixed, international migration is 
regulated and often restricted. The existence of national borders that are relatively 
impermeable is supported by a border bureaucracy, which includes border crossing 
points, border guards, passport controls, entry visas, stamps on one’s passport when 
entering or leaving a country (Mountz 2010). This bureaucracy involves also a whole 
range of border actors including not only state authorities and border guards but also 
non governmental organizations, international organizations, and criminal networks 
for human smuggling and trafficking (see also Cassarino 2006). Although Kyle and 
Koslowski (2001a), p.1) consider that the smuggling of migrants has been officially 
recognized as a global problem as late as 1998, it is important also to acknowledge 
that human smuggling is probably as old as migration restrictions.  
 
People who wish to move to a new country in search of better employment and life 
prospects often do so without appropriate authorization, if they cannot have access to 
legal migration channels. They may of course organize their trip on their own or with 
the help of family and friends based at the country of transit or destination. However, 
the increasing development of the border related bureaucracies and control systems 
mentioned above or simply the geographical distance between the country of origin 
and destination (and the complexity of the trip) make it necessary for the prospective 
irregular migrant to use the services of criminal networks.  In the process of migrating 
without appropriate documents, many prospective migrants use the services of 
individuals or entire networks, who facilitate illegal entry and stay into another 
country.  
 
Indeed probably what is novel in the last decade with regard to human smuggling is 
the professionalization and global nature of the related networks and criminal 
organizations. As Kyle and Koslowski argued about a decade ago (2001a, p.5) the 
smuggling of migrants into countries where they are not allowed to enter is not new, 
what is new is the global spread and development of the phenomenon. Ten years later, 
in 2011, there has been a development of the human smuggling and trafficking 
networks in terms of the breadth and size of their criminal activities and ‘business’ 
turnover, and a growth in the concern of governments and international organizations 
in combating these two related phenomena. Indeed the smuggling of migrants in 
general as well as into Europe in particular has been a priority concern for the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and its special anti-smuggling and 
anti-trafficking training programmes. Also trafficking in human beings, an issue 
closely related to human smuggling, has become a priority concerniii for international 
organizations like the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). 
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In the early scholarly works on migrant smuggling and to some extent to this day the 
terms smuggling and trafficking are used almost interchangeably. Salt and Stein 
(1997) in their seminal article: Migration as a Business: the Case of Trafficking, 
exemplify this kind of confusion. Salt and Stein, (1997), p.467) define trafficking as 
‘an intermediary part of the global migration business facilitating movement of people 
between origin and destination countries’. Salt and Stein just like later Kyle and 
Koslowski (2001b) and the contributors in their volume do not trace a clear line 
between trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. The same is true for instance 
for Tamuray’s (2007) very interesting analysis of the impact of policies combating 
irregular migration at the border on migrants’ exploitation by smugglers. He also 
looks at smuggling and trafficking as phenomena so closely interlinked that it is hard 
to talk about smuggled migrants without crossing the line into the area of trafficking. 
Below we attempt to disentangle the two phenomena while acknowledging the close 
links that exist between them and in particular how hard it is methodologically to 
distinguish between smuggling and trafficking practices.  
 
An official definition of the smuggling of migrants has been adopted in 2000 by the 
United Nations. This was part of the United Nations Conventioniv against 
Transnational Organized Crime, which was accompanied by a Smuggling of Migrants 
Protocol. According to this Protocol, the smuggling of migrants is the 
 
"procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit, of the illegal  entry of a person into a State Party of which 
the person is not a national or a permanent resident." (Article 3, Smuggling 
of Migrants Protocol). 
 
Article 6 of the same Protocol requires states to criminalize both smuggling of 
migrants and enabling of a person to remain in a country illegally, as well as 
aggravating circumstances that endanger lives or safety, or entail inhuman or 
degrading treatment of migrants. The Convention and the Protocol note that almost 
every country in the world is either a country of origin, or a transit or destination 
country for smuggled migrants by profit-seeking agents. The Protocol draws attention 
to the fact that migrant smuggling is a transnational crime and that smuggled migrants 
are often subjected to life-threatening risks and exploitation while the smugglers make 
huge profits by people’s hope for a better life. 
 
The United Nations Protocol adopts the term ‘the smuggling of migrants’ rather than 
human smuggling, but in this work (and more widely in the relevant literature) we use 
the terms ‘migrant smuggling’ and ‘human smuggling’ as synonymous.  
 
By contrast, in this book we treat human trafficking / trafficking in human beings and 
human smuggling / smuggling of migrants as two inter-related but still distinct 
phenomena. 
 
According to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
related Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (Article 3), 
trafficking in persons is defined as:  
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the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs  
 
Compared to the smuggling of migrants, human trafficking differs less in the acts 
committed by traffickers (according to the UN definition these include recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, all acts that are also 
involved in the smuggling of migrants) but more on the means and purpose of these 
acts. 
 
Thus, while smuggling may be seen more as a free agreement and exchange between 
the smuggler – who provides the services – and the prospective migrant – who is the 
customer that needs the services, trafficking involves threat or use of force, coercion, 
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or 
benefits to a person in control of the victim. In addition the purpose is not simply the 
profit, but also the exploitation such as  
sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or similar practices and the removal of 
organs.  
 
The UNODC provides almost a checklist to help authorities and other interested 
actors to ascertain whether a particular circumstance constitutes trafficking in persons: 
 
Table 1.2: What is Trafficking? 
 
 
Source:http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-
humantrafficking.html?ref=menuside, last accessed13 July 2011. 
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In this book the question of trafficking is the object of a specialized chapter that 
discusses in detail the advantages as well as shortcomings of the UN definition and of 
related national and EU legislation in the face of empirical evidence from trafficking 
in Greece (see Chapter Six). Here we shall discuss in some more depth the links 
between human smuggling and irregular migration and asylum seeking with a view 
also to providing definitions of who is an irregular migrant or an asylum seeker as 
again such terms may tend to become blurred when looking at real individual cases. 
 
Human smuggling as a social phenomenon and as an illicit type of business is closely 
connected both to the question of irregular migration and to that of asylum seeking. 
Asylum seekers and irregular migrants who cross a border illegally with the help of 
human smuggling networks share the fact that they enter their transit or destination 
country unauthorized. However, neither all asylum seekers nor all irregular migrants 
cross a border illegally. They may arrive to a country with appropriate documents and 
then apply for asylum (as regards asylum seekers) or (in the case of irregular 
migrants) they may enter a country legally (with a tourist visa for example) and may 
stay longer or violate their conditions of entry and stay (e.g. engage into employment 
without authorization). At the same time, the fact of being smuggled into a country 
does not make one necessarily an undocumented migrant, as a person who is 
smuggled into a country may be fleeing persecution and be entitled to asylum. Thus 
we may consider human smuggling, irregular migration and asylum seeking as three 
overlapping circles. 
 
Figure 1.2: Irregular Migration, Migrant Smuggling and Asylum Seeking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the EU context, international migration means the action by which a person 
establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period 
that is, or is expected to be, of at least twelve months, having previously been usually 
resident in another Member State or a third country. According to the European 
Migration Network’s Glossary on Migration and Asylum, (2010), irregular migration 
is the movement of a person to a new place of residence or transit using irregular or 
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illegal means, without valid documents or carrying false documents. However in the 
relevant social science literature, there are a variety of terms and expressions used for 
persons who engage into some form of ‘illegal’ migration. Thus people who enter a 
country unauthorized, overstay their entry visa, live in a country without the 
appropriate residence permit, and/or break immigration rules in some other way that 
makes them liable to expulsion are called: irregular / illegal /undocumented / 
unauthorized / clandestine migrants, or also ‘sans papiers’ (French), ‘clandestini’ 
(Italian), ‘clandestinos’ (Spanish), λαθρομετανάστες (lathrometanastes) (Greek). 
 
The term “illegal migration” refers, in the broadest sense, to an act of migration that 
is carried out against legal provisions of entry and residence. The European Union, for 
example, uses the term “illegal migration” in this sense (Jandl and Kraler, 2006). 
Sciortino however notes that the term illegal is value-laden and tends to associate this 
type of migration with criminal or otherwise “illicit” behaviour and should therefore 
be avoided (Sciortino, 2004, p.17). Indeed human rights and migrant NGOs have used 
the slogan “No human being is illegal” to denounce that the criminalizing effects of 
using the term ‘illegal migrant’. Indeed as Vogel et al., (2008) argue the term “illegal 
migration” designates the act of entering a country in contravention to the law and is 
confined to illegal border crossing (but not overstaying the terms of visas or 
residence), referring only to a flow and not to a stock of persons.  
 
In recent years, there is a preference in the research and international organization 
expert circles to talk about “irregular migration” to denote a form of migration that is 
“not regular”, “unlawful” or not according to the rules (without necessarily being 
“illegal”, “illicit” or “criminal” in the legal sense). An “irregular migrant” is therefore 
a migrant who, at some point in his migration, has contravened the rules of entry or 
residence. The term ‘undocumented’ migrant is also used widely and while it, strictly 
speaking, refers to a person without the required (and appropriate) residence or ID 
documents, it is used rather generically to talk about people who do not have a legal 
migration status. Pinkerton et al., (2004), p.1) note that undocumented migrant is even 
more neutral than irregular as it simply describes the fact of not having the required 
papers in order, and does not refer to  breaking the law.  
 
Kraler and Vogel, (2008), p. 7) also comment on the term “Unauthorized migrant” 
which refers to people who enter or stay in a country without legal authorization. This 
term however does not include technically speaking those foreigners who do not need 
explicit authorization to enter and live in a country (e.g. if there are free movement 
rights like within the EU). Hence in this case we need to interpret “unauthorized” as 
“not authorized according to the law”.  
 
In this book we adopt the definition provided by the CLANDESTINO research 
project (Kraler and Vogel 2008, p. 7): 
 
Irregular or undocumented residents are defined as residents without any 
legal residence status in the country they are residing in, and those whose 
presence in the territory – if detected – may be subject to termination through 
an order to leave and/or an expulsion order because of their activities.  
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Irregular entrants are persons who cross an international border without the 
required valid documents, either uninspected over land or sea, or over ports of 
entry 
 
The activities of smuggling networks involve the facilitation of both irregular entry 
and stay (in transit or destination countries). They include different types of illegal 
services such as smuggling somebody through an unguarded part of the border, 
outside a border crossing point, in land or at sea. They involve procuring somebody 
with false papers (e.g. a fake passport or visa) to enter or transit through a country. 
The smuggler harbours the smuggled persons while in transit in specific places. 
  
People using the services of human smugglers may however be not only irregular 
migrants but also asylum seekers. The term ‘asylum seekers’ encompasses several 
categories of people and is used often rather generically especially in the media. 
According to the European Migration Network Glossary, (2010), asylum is  
 
A form of protection given by a State on its territory based on the principle of 
non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognised refugee rights. 
It is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his/her country of 
citizenship and/or residence in particular for fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion 
 
In an EU context, there are also two related terms that refer to people in need of 
international protection and that are often not distinguished from asylum in common 
parlance or even for policy purposes are seen as being included in the broader 
framework of asylum policy. These terms are subsidiary protection which refers to 
the protection given to a third country national or a stateless person who does not 
qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in 
the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, 
would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (see European 
Migration Network Glossary, (2010).   
 
In addition in the EU context the term temporary protection is used to refer to a 
procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass influx or 
imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to 
return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary protection to such persons, 
in particular if there is also a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this 
influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests of the persons. 
(European Migration Network Glossary, (2010) 
 
People who are seeking asylum and who would qualify as refugees or as people in 
need of international protection are often fleeing their country of origin with fake 
passports (in order to evade persecution) and lack the necessary documents (e.g. a 
visa) to enter their first safe destination country. In addition they may use the services 
of human smugglers in their effort to escape from their country of origin. Upon arrival 
at the destination country and when studying the role and nature of smuggling 
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networks, it can be quite problematic to distinguish between asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants (the main distinction between the two being that the former are 
fleeing persecution and are in need of protection while the latter are moving mainly 
for economic reasons). Actually the reason is not only the unauthorized entry of either 
into the destination country’s territory but also the general blurring of the distinction 
between asylum seekers and economic migrants today. People fleeing for instance 
from Bangladesh or Pakistan or India mainly for economic reasons may have been 
pushed to emigrate also for political reasons (because they belong to a lower caster or 
they supported the ‘wrong’ party or originate from the ‘wrong’ clan of families).  The 
empirical research presented in this book concentrates on the fact that people have 
been smuggled across the Mediterranean, from Asia and Africa into southern Europe, 
regardless of whether their motivations for moving have been mainly political or 
predominantly economic. 
 
2.2 Human smuggling: a business or a social process? 
 
From a conceptual perspective, this book aims at advancing our knowledge and 
understanding of the two opposed perspectives on migration: the economic paradigm 
that views migration as a business, driven mainly by economic motivations and the 
social paradigm that puts more emphasis on the socio-economic context within which 
irregular migration and even smuggling networks and activities are rooted.  
 
From an economic perspective, migrant smuggling is a business, albeit an illicit one. 
Attention is paid to the money involved in the smuggling business and to the 
modalities that the smuggling networks used to transfer this money as well as to the 
financial gain that migrants and their families (expect to) make when engaging into 
irregular migration asking for the services of smugglers. Interestingly some scholars 
have argued that the globalization of transport and communication technologies and 
the increasing migration restrictions in economically developed countries have led to 
the increased professionalization of the smuggling business (Salt and Stein 1997; 
Kyle and Koslowski 2001).  
 
Koser (2008) has also argued that a purely economic analysis of whether migrant 
smuggling pays is necessary to understand the dynamics of the phenomenon. Indeed 
Koser (2008) has sought to assess the economic costs and gains of families in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan who sent one of their members illegally to the UK using the 
services of a smuggling network. The study has shown that those who succeeded in 
staying in the UK and finding employment paid back the initial ‘investment’ to the 
smugglers after two years. After paying back their remittances back to the household 
of origin doubled its income. Hence overall the initial investment and risk was 
considered to be worth it.  
 
Friebel and Guriev (2006) theoretically examined the interaction between migrants 
and smuggling agents. They assumed that not all potential irregular migrants are able 
to pay for the smuggling services upfront. Some thus enter into a debt contract with 
the smuggler promising that they will pay back the debt once they find work at 
destination. Friebel and Guriev showed that while stricter border enforcement 
discourages all potential migrants (regardless of whether they are able to pay upfront 
or not) better detection in the formal employment sector discourages the unauthorized 
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entry for those who are not financially constrained but actually encourages those who 
are. In other words, the smuggling is skewed towards the poorer migrants.  
 
In another interesting study on how policies combating irregular migration and 
smuggling networks affect potential irregular immigrants, Tamuray (2007) showed 
that policies that reduce the number of active smugglers in the area, are likely to raise 
the mean exploitation in the market. Tamuray notes that migrants do not know if their 
prospective smugglers are exploitative or not (whether they are actually traffickers, 
exploiting their customers/victims at destination or whether they are mere smugglers, 
delivering the service for an agreed fee) and hence cannot make an informed decision 
of whether they prefer to pay a higher fee and avoid exploitation upon arrival or 
whether they prefer or simply can only afford the lower fee but exploitation at 
destination. So Tamuray argues that increased enforcement raises the risks and costs 
for smugglers and drives non exploitative smugglers out of the market. Thus, it 
indirectly raises the probability that irregular migrants seeking the services of 
smugglers will be exploited. 
 
Studies like these actually consider all the factors involved in the irregular migration 
and using the services of a smuggler decision as a cost-benefit calculation of the 
migrant. They relate the decision and the choice of the smuggler mostly to the 
expected income after the migration, the cost of the smuggling services (and whether 
it is affordable or not) and the overall equilibrium in terms of information, risks and 
profits of all the agents involved (smugglers and smuggled migrants). There is no 
place in this model for social considerations about who introduces the migrant to the 
smuggling networks, what kind of trust (or fear) relations there are between the 
customer and the service provider, who is the smuggler and what is his position in the 
overall migration networks at the country of origin, transit or destination. 
 
These and other factors by contrast lie at the heart of the socio-economic paradigm for 
analyzing the activities and modus operandi of human smuggling networks. This 
approach pays more attention to the socio-economic context of migration looking at 
the social and cultural processes that facilitate migration and to the ways in which 
migration alters the socioeconomic context at communities of origin. This approach 
sees migration also to a large extent as driven by economic factors behind which a 
wider array of social relations and experiences can lead people to move unlawfully 
and to ask for the services of smugglers.  
 
Herman (2006) in her analysis of sub Saharan and North African migrants to Italy and 
Spain who entered without papers and of irregular migrants in the Netherlands shows 
that social networks are of crucial importance for the decision to migrate, the planning 
of the trip and the settling down at the destination country (including regularizing 
one’s migration status). In line with Boyd (1989) and Staring (2001), Herman argues 
that familial, friendship and co-ethnic ties are crucial for the success of the migration 
project of an individual. She elaborates on the role of ‘weak’ vs. ‘strong’ ties with the 
transit and destination countries depending on whether prospective migrants had close 
or distant family members or friends in the destination country. She shows that strong 
ties are particularly important for all immigrants regardless of age or gender. In 
addition her informants consider the existence of family and other social networks of 
crucial importance for the success of their journey. In other words, the study 
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emphasizes both the objective and subjective importance of social networks in the 
irregular migration process. 
 
The socio-economic paradigm in the analysis of human smuggling draws attention 
also to the social organization of the smugglers’ networks. Several studies (including 
the empirical research presented in this book) have documented that smuggling 
networks may be more or less loosely organized but usually all include a certain 
degree of differentiation of functions. Borrowing the terminology used by Chin 
(2001), there are the ‘big snakeheads’ – the investors in the business, the ‘little 
snakeheads’ – the recruiters, the ‘transporters’ who organize and execute the long 
distance trips including accompanying migrants across borders, the ‘guides’ who 
move smuggled migrants from one transit point to the next and/or meet them up at 
ports and airports, the ‘enforcers’ who look after smuggled migrants at safe houses 
and while en route, the corrupt officials of the country of origin / transit / or 
destination  and last but not least, a range of local actors located at transit points who 
provide food and lodging for the irregular migrants in transit. While people higher up 
in the hierarchy may be involved in other types of organized crime (see Chapter 4 
below but also Spener, 2001) such as drug trafficking, others, especially the local 
agents or the guides may be people with ‘normal’ jobs who give a hand to smugglers 
in order to make some additional income. Actually the complex nature and 
embeddedness of the networks is one of the issues that we look into in this book. 
 
Actually even scholars like Koser (2008) who concentrate on the profit made by 
smuggling and assess why smuggling continues (because it pays) also indirectly 
recognize the importance of the family in the decision on whether to migrate and how 
to organize the trip. Human smuggling has a strong business aspect in that it moves 
around money: migrants who migrate without papers often do so for economic 
reasons (even though some move also for seeking asylum); they therefore ask for the 
smugglers’ services in helping them find a way into the desired country of 
destination; and they pay for these services. However, the very nature of the 
phenomenon – its illegal character, the risks and uncertainties involved in the trip, the 
absence of any kind of written agreement between the parties, the ambivalent 
relationship between smugglers and smuggled which is characterized by both trust 
and fear (see also Chapters Four and Five in this book), point to the importance of 
analyzing the social aspects of the business rather than concentrating on its 
profitability only.  
 
This study casts light to the complexities of the human smuggling phenomenon by 
investigating both its business and its social relational aspects. From a business point 
of view we investigate the fees paid, the modality of payment, the means of transport, 
the journey, the documents. From a social relational perspective we examine in depth 
the relationship between the smuggler and the smuggled migrants, the migrants’ 
views of the smugglers, the internal organization of the smuggling networks. We thus 
seek to answer the above both theoretical and empirical dilemma: should migrant 
smuggling be treated as just another criminal activity, another type of criminal 
business that can be suppressed through tougher enforcement? Or should migrant 
smuggling be considered a more comprehensive social phenomenon, combating 
which involves understanding better the social relations and networks that lie behind 
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it? Such relations may in fact be enmeshed with local societies and economies of 
countries of origin, transit and destination. 
 
2.3 Geographical area and context of the study 
 
The book concentrates on the crossing of the Mediterranean from south/southeast to 
north and northwest by African and Asian migrants. We have chosen this area for our 
study as it is an area that has seen irregular migration intensifying over the last few 
years and represents the main path for entry into the European continent writ large 
and more specifically into European Union countries.  
 
During the last decade, the wider southeast Mediterranean region has been affected by 
a number of international and regional geopolitical and economic developments that 
have contributed to increasing migration outflows from the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean to its northern shores, notably Greece, Italy and Spain (as well as 
Malta and Cyprus). The last ten years have been marked by continuing political 
instability and warfare in Iraq, persisting violence between Israelis and Palestinians, 
civil war and ethnic strife in Sudan and Somalia, only to name a few of the conflicts 
in the wider region. Economic disparities between the global North and the global 
South have also grown unabated while climate change poses an even more pressing 
and worrying challenge for Africa and Asia in particular. The above factors have 
contributed to maintaining or indeed increasing migration and asylum pressures on 
southern EU member states located at the geographical periphery of the EU and hence 
exposed to the arrival of irregular migrants and asylum seekers.  
 
Greece, Italy and Spain being at the southeast corner of Europe and in close proximity 
to important emigration and transit countries like the Maghreb, Turkey, Egypt and 
Libya have found themselves directly affected by the increasing migration and asylum 
pressures from Africa and Asia. They have thus become both important destination 
countries for smuggled migrants as well as stepping stones for migrants in transit to 
EU countries further north and west.  
 
The situation has further developed during the last few months (spring 2011) as 
people in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have revolted against the authoritarian regimes in 
their countries. While Egypt and Tunisia are heading towards elections and relatively 
peaceful socio-political change, in Libya the forces of the Gaddafi regimes are 
fighting against the ‘rebels’ while NATO countries are bombing the former with a 
view to (supposedly) protecting civilians. Indeed the Arab spring of 2011 has changed 
the power balance in the region and created a new set of conditions for the Euro-
mediterranean relations (European Commission 2011, Communication on the 
European Union and its Neighbourhood) and in particular with regard to (irregular) 
migration. 
 
The situation in Lampedusa and Italy more widely during the first six months of 2011 
has changed dramatically. There were hardly any irregular migration or asylum 
seeking arrivals from Libya during 2010 (for more see Chapter Two in this book), the 
last months have seen the arrival of approximately 20,000 Tunisians, mostly young 
men, leaving their country. After the end of March there have been increasing 
numbers of Sub Saharan African immigrants who were fleeing warfare and racist 
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violence in Libya (approximately 30,000 people have arrived to Italy via the small 
island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily). The numbers of irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers fleeing North Africa to seek protection and a better life in Europe may appear 
rather high (more than 50,000 people in less than 5 months). If put in context though 
they have been overall relatively low, since according to IOM there is approximately 
650,000 refugees, mostly people from Sub Saharan African countries, hosted by 
Egypt and Tunisia in temporary camps. Despite their own internal political problems 
these two countries are hosting, even if temporarily, a number of people that is 13 
times higher than those who have been hosted by Italy, a country with far more 
resources than Egypt or Tunisia.  
 
 
It is in this context that we approach the question of smuggling of migrants across the 
Mediterranean sea. This book covers all the main routes of migrant smuggling from 
Africa and Asia across the Mediterranean to Europe. From an empirical research 
perspective, the book seeks to shed light to the routes of migrant smuggling across the 
Mediterranean, the modus operandi and internal organization of smuggling networks, 
the experiences of migrants themselves and their relationships with smugglers. We 
seek to understand better both the subjective and the objective aspects of the 
phenomenon of migrant smuggling.  
 
In particular we cast light to the motivations of migrants and the discrepancy if any 
between their expectations and the realities they face during the trip and upon arrival 
to their first European destination (i.e. Greece, Italy, Spain or Malta). We discuss the 
reality of ‘transit’ and the related concept of transit migration: who is in transit and 
how can we assess that?  
 
Last but not least we explore the formation and transformation of migrant smuggling 
routes and the ways in which they relate (or not) to previously established migration 
systems. A migration system is defined as a group of origin and destination countries 
that is characterized by stable and close economic, cultural and political relations that 
have existed for at least a few decades and that have facilitated migration flows in 
either direction between the countries involved in the system. We argue (see Chapter 
Three for more details) that Greece and Turkey constitute an irregular migration 
system which actually provides for the wider socio-economic and policy framework 
within which migrant smuggling develops in the region. Interestingly, between the 
time when our fieldwork was conducted (fall 2009-2010) and today there has been an 
important shift of smuggling networks operations from the Turkish coasts to the 
Aegean islands in Greece (e.g. Mytilene, Chios, Samos) to the Greek Turkish land 
border in northeastern Greece. This shift is documented in this book, in Chapter Five 
in particular. 
 
While our fieldwork does not cover these most recent months, and hence we cannot 
offer primary data for analyzing the operation of smugglers between Libya and Italy, 
we make the most of secondary sources to explain in Chapter Two how migrant 
smuggling – the networks and their modus operandi – have been affected by the Arab 
spring events and the new conditions of political instability in Tunisia and Egypt and 
war in Libya.  
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Before presenting in some more detail the structure and contents of this book we shall 
discuss critically below the European Union policies for combating irregular 
migration and in particular the main measures taken for controlling the border, the EU 
return policy as well as the effort to externalize border controls and of course the 
human rights concerns that these issues raise.  
 
 
 
3. European policies combating irregular migration and human smuggling  
 
The global approach to migration adopted by the European Union (EU) includes, as 
one of its main aims, the fight against irregular migration. In other words, policies 
targeting irregular migration are closely related to policies concerning legal flows and 
migrant integration. The issue of irregular migration is interlinked with a range of 
other issues, both internal to EU member states, such as the shadow economy and the 
informal labour market, and external to them, such as relations with transit and source 
countries and development cooperation. This section discusses those EU irregular 
migration policies that are of special relevance for combating human smuggling and 
critically assesses their scope and effectiveness and the human rights concerns that 
they raise.  
 
In the sections below we discuss the overall institutional framework and how irregular 
migration emerged as a policy priority at EU level. We then review two broad policy 
areas through which irregular migration is being curtailed. Firstly, border 
management policies (through policing measures and border cooperation among EU 
member states), and second indirectly (through cooperation with sending and transit 
countries).  
 
 
3.1 Institutional framework: Integration, institutions, and measures 
 
[ pages not made available through this free excerpt] 
 
 
 
 
3.3 EU irregular migration policies and human rights concerns 
 
In a recent article, Carling and Hernandez-Carretero (2011) consider the trade-off 
between protecting the borders of the EU and protecting the migrants who try to cross 
without appropriate authorization. Carling and Hernandez-Carretero consider the case 
of irregular migration from West Africa to the Canary Islands in Spain, and the 
evolution of smuggling network activities in the region as a result of stricter border 
controls and more effective cooperation between Spain and transit countries including 
Morocco but also Mauritania and Senegal. The two authors point out that externalized 
migration control in the form of pre-border patrolling can yield important results in 
curbing irregular migration and human smuggling activities. They also however note 
that more effective direct controls at the border can lead to new smuggling strategies 
rather than to an overall reduction of irregular migration. Thus, smugglers, as 
16  
happened in the case of sub Saharan African immigration to the Canary islands may 
relocate their business further south (this involving higher fees and higher risks for 
prospective migrants) and of course they may also use newer technological means 
(e.g. satellite phones) to avoid detection. 
 
Carling and Hernandez-Carretero’s conclusions (2011) support those of Sandell 
(2005), Carling (2007a and 2007b) and Spijkerboer (2007) that where incentives to 
migration (including the existence of informal work opportunities) persist stricter 
border controls may lead simply to greater costs and risks for the irregular migrant 
rather than an effective stop of irregular migration.  
In a recent report on migrant smuggling, the International Council for Human Rights 
Policy (ICHRP 2010) points to the fact that every individual is entitled to certain 
fundamental rights by virtue of their humanity, regardless of their legal status. Some 
categories of undocumented migrants are afforded special protection. These include 
recognized asylum seekers as well as those who claim refugee status. More recently 
the European Commission has adopted special protection measures for people who 
are considered to have been trafficked (Directive 2001/36/EU). 
Irregular migrants more broadly and smuggled migrants in particular enjoy a lower 
level of protection as their protection may seem to counter indirectly the interests of 
states and their citizens. In some regards also the state’s legal obligation towards 
irregular migrants may also be considered unclear because of the irregular migration 
status of these last. However, this does not mean that the obligation for protecting 
people’s fundamental rights does not exist as states have specific responsibilities to 
provide protection to all people who fall within their jurisdiction, including irregular 
migrants (ICHRP 2010).  
 
With regard to smuggled migrants the need for such protection is particularly 
important because their very condition of being smuggled into the country makes 
them particularly vulnerable to abuse and criminal exploitation by the smuggling 
networks. The issue is of particular concern to the extent that it is not always easy to 
distinguish upon arrival at the destination country between irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers or people in need of international protection. Indeed EU countries and 
generally states that have signed the 1951 Geneva Convention have specific legal 
duties in relation to refugees and asylum seekers, including the obligation of non-
refoulement and the obligations to provide effective protection and to search for 
durable solutions. The above human rights issues come up with special relevance 
when one investigates human smuggling on the ground and realizes how the 
legitimate desire of states to control their borders can run counter to human rights 
concerns and can seriously endanger the human rights of irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers. This chapter concludes with a presentation of the contents of this 
book. 
 
4. Contents of the book  
 
In the chapter that follows (Chapter Two) we offer an overview of migrant smuggling 
in the western part of the Mediterranean sea. In particular, we survey recent research 
on migrant smuggling from and through North Africa to Spain, Italy and Malta and 
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present up to date statistical data and estimates on irregular migrant and human 
smuggling in the region. The chapter casts light to the routes travelled and the 
modalities (fees, means of transport) adopted by migrant smuggling networks. It looks 
at the internal organization of these networks and their transnational or ethicized 
character. The chapter seeks to assess the importance of smuggling business actors 
and family or personal networks in the overall migration project of smuggled migrants 
across the western part of the Mediterranean. It also reviews the policy responses of 
Italy, Spain and Malta aiming at combating irregular migration and in particular 
migrant smuggling in recent years. It compares the different policies adopted in 
particular by Spain and Italy and their related success or failure. It discusses the 
normative/human rights and economic implications of each set of policies.  
 
Special attention is paid to the most recent changes caused by the Arab spring and in 
particular by the war in Libya which has overturned the previous arrangements 
between the Italian and Libyan authorities that had practically stopped the irregular 
migration and asylum seeking flows via Libya to Italy and Malta. Although these 
developments are very recent and we have not had the possibility to conduct 
fieldwork in Italy in recent months, we use here information obtained from non-
governmental and international organizations in the effort to assess how the situation 
has evolved in recent months and how smuggling networks have seized the 
opportunity and adapted to the new situation. 
 
Chapter Three looks at the special dynamics of the wider southeastern Mediterranean 
region which is located at the crossroads of both Asian and African irregular 
migration and migrant smuggling routes. More specifically this chapter sets the 
framework and outlines the characteristics of what we have called the Greece-Turkey 
irregular migration system. It discusses the overall size and features of irregular 
migration flows from Turkey to Greece and reviews the relevant literature on 
smuggling in the region. The second part of the chapter reviews in more detail the 
Greek immigration control policies and the Greek asylum system as well as its 
European policy framework. We argue that these policies and their implementation 
have directly or indirectly contributed to the rise of irregular migration inflows and in 
particular to the development of the migrant smuggling networks along the Greek 
Turkish border. 
 
Chapter Four concentrates on migrant smuggling from Africa towards Greece. It 
investigates the routes and modalities of migrant smuggling from East and West 
Africa via North Africa and/or Turkey to Greece as well as from North Africa to 
Greece, via Turkey or directly. The chapter outlines the main routes and modalities of 
migrant smuggling in this region, the internal organization of smugglers’ networks. It 
confronts the objective aspects of migrant smuggling (routes, means of transport, fees, 
duration, demographic and socio-economic features of smuggled migrants, visa 
requirements in countries of transit and related issues) with the subjective experience 
of the migrants (their own way of making sense of their migration project and in 
particular of the trip). The chapter pays attention to the relationship between 
smugglers and smuggled people and the degree of agency of the migrant in the whole 
process (starting at the country of origin when s/he first sought for the services of the 
smuggler and continuing through the trip and upon arrival in ‘Europe’/Greece), an 
issue that is of particular theoretical interest in the effort to assess the special features 
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of migrant smuggling as a ‘social business’. Naturally attention is paid to the risks and 
vulnerabilities that migrants face during the trip and the factors that enhance or 
mitigate such risks/vulnerability including kinship and co-ethnic networks. This 
chapter concludes by discussing the ways in which Greek policies for combating 
irregular migration have affected the migrant smuggling phenomenon in recent years. 
 
Chapter Five looks at Asian immigration and asylum seeking flows via Turkey to 
Greece. The chapter looks in particular at migrant smuggling networks that operate in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It reviews the modus operandi of these 
networks, the routes, fees and means of transport as well as the duration of the trip. It 
explores the relationship between migrant smuggling and labour trafficking looking at 
the ways in which migrants raise the necessary economic capital to pay the smugglers 
and whether this leads them to debt bondage and work at slave like conditions while 
en route in Turkey or in Greece. Similarly to chapter Four, this chapter highlights the 
risks and vulnerability of the migrants and discusses their agency in the smuggling 
process. It reviews the nature of Asian smuggling networks and the relationship 
between smugglers and smuggled migrants. Again the chapter concludes with an 
assessment of how Greek policies for combating irregular migration and unlawful 
border crossing affect migrant smuggling from Asia to Greece. 
 
Chapter Six concentrates on the related even if conceptually distinct phenomenon of 
trafficking in human beings from Africa and Asia via Turkey to Greece. This chapter 
discusses the routes used by trafficking networks, their organization and their modus 
operandi. It pays attention to the strategies for recruiting the victims, the fees 
involved, the relationship between the traffickers and the trafficked, the means of 
transport used and the overall process of subordination and exploitation of the 
victims. The chapter also reviews the related Greek policies combating trafficking in 
human beings and the civil society support to victims of trafficking in human beings. 
The links and connections between migrant smuggling and trafficking in human 
beings in the southeastern Mediterranean region are also discussed with special 
reference to the Greece Turkey irregular migration system. 
 
Asian and African smuggled migrants who arrive in Greece often aim to move further 
west and north to another European country. This happens either because they have 
relatives there (usually a sibling, a parent, or even a spouse) or because they expect 
employment to be more profitable and living conditions better than in Greece. 
Chapter Seven reviews the modus operandi of migrant smuggling networks that seek 
to ‘help’ migrants cross from Greece to Italy, notably from the ports of Patras or 
Igoumenitsa to one of the connected Italian ports (Bari, Brindisi, Ancona, Venice). It 
looks at the modalities of migrant smuggling and the role that Greek policies play in 
preventing irregular migrants from moving further from Greece to other EU countries. 
 
In the concluding chapter, we provide an overview of the migrant smuggling across 
the Mediterranean both as a business that involves actors that are in it only for profit 
and as a social process that explores the social and cultural aspects of the 
phenomenon, for instance the role of kinship and co ethnic networks, the organization 
of the smuggling along racial or ethnic lines, the gendered nature of the experience 
(the trip is experienced in different ways by men and women and this is an aspect 
worth exploring even if women are overall under-represented in migrant smuggling 
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across the Mediterranean). This chapter discusses critically the usefulness of the 
concept of transit migration, the dividing line between migrant smuggling and labour 
trafficking and last but not least the ways in which policies at receiving countries 
shape the migrant smuggling ‘business’ and construct irregular migration. The chapter 
concludes by discussing how policies for combating migrant smuggling and irregular 
migration in the southern European countries shape migrant smuggling. Lastly, we 
discuss the policy and political implications of our findings for the southern European 
countries and for the EU overall. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Migrant Smuggling from Africa to Spain, Italy and Malta: A comparative 
overview 
 
[not available here] 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
The southeastern Mediterranean: the Greece-Turkey irregular migration system  
 
[not available here] 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Human Smuggling from/via North Africa and Turkey to Greece  
 
[pages not available here] 
 
 
 
4.2 The Smuggling Routes from Africa via Turkey to Greece 
 
We have identified three main routes through which migrants are smuggled to Greece.  
The first route originates in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia or Libya) and its 
main transit stop is in Egypt, at Cairo. Of course Cairo may also be the place of origin 
of some of the smuggled migrants. People usually travel by plane to Cairo (or more 
rarely and if they want to save money by truck, car or on foot). They then wait in 
Cairo for some days and are transported by plane to Izmir usually. They spend there a 
period of time between a couple of weeks and a couple of months. Somebody then 
signals them that ‘the day’ has arrived and they are brought to some remote place on 
the coast near Izmir, embark usually a small boat with a motor engine and cross to 
Greece. From Egypt and Libya some people also travel directly by plane to Istanbul in 
Turkey. The waiting period in this case takes place in Istanbul. Again they may wait 
there for a couple of months until the day of the transfer to Greece arrives. In this case 
they may be issued a regular bus ticket or may be driven by van to the coast, further 
south, near Aivali, and cross to one of the islands. The cost of this route is 1,000 Euro 
for the smugglers’ services plus the expenses of the migrant her/himself while en 
route (notably accommodation at special ‘hotels’ as we shall explain below) and food. 
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Map 4.1: Smuggling Route no. 1: From North Africa to Greece 
 
 
 
 
The second route originates in East Africa and follows the same transit stops. People 
are transported by plane to Cairo in Egypt, then by plane again to Istanbul in Turkey. 
Then they wait there as described above for a few months until they are driven to the 
coast and provided for a boat to cross to one of the islands of the Aegean. If they 
arrive in Istanbul, in some cases they wait there until they are driven by truck to the 
Greek Turkish land border along Evros river and cross that border at night, by truck or 
by van (none has reported crossing the river by boat or alone on foot). The cost of this 
route is between 2,000 and 3,000 Euro depending on the place of origin. In this route, 
we encountered three informants (migrants no. 24, 36, 43) that had organised the trip 
largely by themselves, locating in each transit place a local smuggler and paying for 
the next leg of the journey or for the next border crossing. For one informant the 
duration of the trip was actually much longer (migrant no. 36) as he stayed about 6 
months in each intermediate stop (Libya, Syria, Turkey).  
 
In all other cases, plane was the main means of transport until arrival to Turkey at 
least. Nonetheless interviews with African migrant communities (professionals no. 3, 
4, 5) suggest that many migrants smuggled from sub Saharan Africa to Turkey and 
then Greece take up the journey partly on their own, paying separately for each leg of 
the journey until they reach Turkey and then Greece. 
 
 
Map 4.2: Human Smuggling Routes from East Africa to Greece  
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Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.3: Smuggling routes from West Africa to Greece 
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Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
 
The unfolding of the routes, once the migrant is smuggled into Greece varies. For 
those who cross via Evros, there is no apprehension usually. They manage to cross the 
border by van or lorry, they then meet up with local contacts and are put into cars (3-4 
people together) and are driven to Thessaloniki. Our informants did not report being 
caught either near the border or on their way to Thessaloniki. 
 
By contrast, if the point of arrival is one of the Aegean islands, the smuggled migrants 
are caught either while still on the boat, approaching the island, or upon arrival at the 
coast. Some report that the Greek authorities tried to push them back into Turkish 
waters, others do not. Their accounts are in line with the accounts provided by Greek 
police and coastguard authorities both in Athens and in Mytilene who actually admit 
that they try to push back dinghies to Turkish waters.  
 
 
 
[.. pages not available here] 
 
4.5  Internal organization of smuggling networks and smugglers’ profiles 
 
As one informant put it (professional no.1) smuggling and trafficking networks may 
be said to resemble international terrorism networks in that they are polycentric, 
loosely organised, each local group working in some autonomy from the other. 
Nonetheless the network as such is overarching. Also as another informant put it 
(professional no. 2) migrant smuggling networks are involved in organised crime but 
should not be conceived as ‘mafias’; there are no families, nor clans, nor any specific 
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persons pulling the strings. These organisations are task-driven. Their local contacts, 
their international coordination, their methods have to do with the job at hand. This is 
the driving force, and the money behind it, of course.  
 
They appear to have a clear hierarchy. The few high level members of the network are 
those who profit the most and are actually involved in several types of criminal 
activities including not only smuggling of migrants but also drugs as well as legal 
business, such as travel agencies or transport companies for instance (professional no. 
2 and 8). Their legal economic activities are used to pursue their illegal work and also 
to recycle the money they make through their criminal activities. 
 
Middle- and lower-level agents of the network can be found at each location, in the 
countries of origin, at important transit stops, at the last ports of entry in Turkey 
(notably in Izmir and Istanbul) and of course also in Greece. At the country of origin, 
the prospective migrant will meet the middle-level agents who have the international 
connections and hold the key contacts for issuing tickets and passports. They discuss 
the destination and agree to a price. These middle level agents organise the trip, issue 
the necessary (false) identity documents and buy the airplane tickets.  
 
It is difficult to know who the boss is. It’s secret. You come to Chartoum, you 
ask, you do the business with him. You don’t ask for more. Many officers 
[are] doing this. Every officer has his own friends (maybe other officers) to 
help him. Some people used to rent house to Eritreans and Ethiopians. You 
know this? Receive Eritreans and Ethiopians and put them in house, and took 
from everyone 2,000 dollars in order to help to leave Sudan. Make Sudanese 
passport for him and visa from the police authority, and Turkish visa also. 
Included in the 2,000 dollars. When you are rich, some people give you their 
passport. And then send the passport back (migrants no 43) 
 
Another important task performed by middle-level agents is the purchase of vessels 
by the network. According to the Greek Coastguard (professional no. 2), in cases of 
purchases of speedboats costing around 150,000 euros there are different people 
involved performing various roles. First there is a person with a heavy criminal record 
that collects the funds from different kinds of illicit activities. He uses, say, two 
persons that buy two such vessels on the names of two different petty criminals. 
Boats, smugglers and smuggled persons are not necessarily from one place or even 
one country though: the Greek Coastguard told us of a captured cargo ship owned by 
a Syrian that left Syria, picked up 85 Egyptian migrants from Egypt and headed to 
Greece. In cases of cheaper rubber boats or old vessels with a small engine, there are 
certain shipyards in Izmir or Aivali (professional no. 19) that sell such equipment. 
 
When travelling by plane, the connection between the smugglers at the country of 
origin and the smugglers at the transit country is pre-organised. Thus, the local agents 
meet the ‘customers’ at airports and escort them to specific accommodation places 
(called ‘hotels’v). Contact and communication with them is limited. The local agents 
return only to pick the migrants up on the day of departure for crossing the border. 
The migrant has no say as to the departure date and receives no advance notice. 
Middle-level agents also ask for more money for the accommodation and living 
expenses of the migrants while in transit. Sometimes this job is done by settled 
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migrants in Turkey or local Turks that ‘keep an eye’ on the everyday needs and issues 
of the migrants/refugees waiting in these ‘hotels’. At other times this appears to be a 
method for recruiting lower-level agents for the network.  
 
 
[… pages not available here] 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Human Smuggling from/via Asia and Turkey 
 
[pages not available] 
 
 
Looking more specifically into the routes of Afghans, the ones coming from 
Afghanistan enter Iran either via the Afghan-Iranian border near Herat or via 
Kandahar and the region of Balochistan (and the transit hub city of Quetta) in south 
Pakistan (migrants no. 56, 57, 74, 75, 76, 59, professional no.20). In some cases, 
crossing the Afghan-Iranian and Pakistani-Iranian border occurs autonomously 
without the use of the smugglers’ services; using mostly kin networks that extend to 
Afghans belonging to the existing large Afghan community in Iran and circulating in 
the region for business and/or family purposes (migrant no. 57, 74, 76).  
Afghan refugees that had been living in Pakistan come into Iran via south Pakistan 
following the same routes with Pakistanis and other Afghans and Bangladeshis. 
Pakistan hosts around 1.7 million registered Afghans who have the right to stay in 
Pakistan until the end of 2012vi. Indeed crossing the Pakistani-Iranian border is easy. 
As an Afghan born in Pakistan explains, 
 
I knew the language. A lot of Afghans are there. There was not a big problem. 
I left the borders of Pakistan and I entered Iran. Iran is a very difficult country 
to be. One  month I stayed in Iran outside. I didn’t have a house (migrant 
no.83). 
 
Secondly, the residents of the region of Balochistan (southwest Pakistan) bordering 
with Iran speak both farsi and urdu and have always had commercial relations with 
each other. Pakistanis buying plastic products and petrol from Iran and Iranians 
buying other products in the Pakistani side of the border have been everyday practices 
promoting border-crossing for years in this region. In the words of one of our key 
informants,  
 
you know Iran has embargo. And has a lot of fuels in its possession. Where is 
it going to take it? 8 years ago the price of petrol in Iran was like 3 cents per 
liter and in Pakistan 30 cents. If you buy 100 litres from Iran and you resell it 
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to Pakistan you made your day’s earnings. That’s what smugglers do. They 
shop. You leave Pakistan with 10 people inside, they don’t check, they say 
nothing. And you return on the same day full with merchandise (migrant no. 
66).   
 
When in Iran, the smuggling routes of Afghans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis start 
spanning across the country and involve many short transit stops in several Iranian 
villages and towns. The routes taken vary considerably within Iran. Depending on the 
smuggling network’s bribing capacity and the density of its local contacts, one may 
notice substantial detours in a smuggled migrant’s journey. There are Pakistanis who 
enter and cross Iran from its very south, and go from Chabahar, a town in the Iranian 
southeast close to the border with Pakistan, to Bandar-e-Abbas that is situated 
opposite Dubai. And then do not follow the Bandar-e-Abbas Teheran highway which 
is the straightforward option but take a detour to Shiraz, remaining in south Iran 
(migrants no. 67, 72). As one of our key informants, whose cousin is a smuggler 
bringing Pakistanis and others in Greece from the late 1990s up to date, said: 
 
Usually they don’t go to Shiraz because it’s very far. The smuggler took them 
there because there is less police control on the road to Shiraz. On the other 
hand, there is a lot of control to cars that are heading to Teheran. From 
Sarhadan to Teheran for example, the police checks 20 times. And not just the 
police but the religious ‘police’ that do a lot of searches for drugs, for women 
travelling and what they are wearing, where they go and such stuff (migrant 
no.66). 
  
Detours also provide some level of assurance to cheap deals that cost relatively little 
to both the migrant and the smuggler who employs a small part of the network’s 
resources. Indicatively, R. who stroke a cheap deal with the smuggling broker (6,500 
euros in June 2009 as opposed to 8,500) and a flexible way of payment (4,000 upon 
arrival and the rest while working in Greece) crossed Iran with the minimal 
‘investment’ from the smuggler’s side: he reached Tehran along with 20 other 
migrants in one vehicle (a big truck carrying soil), which in itself is quite rare, and did 
big detours in order to avoid police road blocks. Characteristically, after leaving the 
region of Zahedan, he was taken to Bam that has a direct link to Tehran and, instead 
of moving forward, his truck turned straight down to Bandar-e-Abbas (migrant no. 
69).  
 
Others take a more straightforward route, from Zahedan to Tehran (migrant no. 63). 
Some cross Iran with minimum stops on the road avoiding cities (migrant no. 73). In 
any case though, a frequent change of drivers and vehicles is part and parcel of every 
journey. In front of the vehicles (vans/trucks) carrying the migrants there usually are 
other cars checking the road ahead and informing drivers about roadblocks and how 
to best avoid them (usually by waiting until the road is clear, walking on foot around 
the roadblocks and being picked up again by the trucks afterwards). 
 
The Tehran province is a key transit hub where migrants both arrange deals with 
smuggling brokers and wait for some days or months until they continue with the next 
leg of the journey, which is reaching Orumijeh and the mountain of Salmas. The 
journey from Tehran to the Iranian-Turkish mountainous border zone is done with 
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private cars, ‘taxis’, carrying a few migrants at a time.  
 
Spent 15 days in Teheran and then in groups of five people we were driven 
with private cars to Salmas (migrant no. 67). We were left outside Teheran to 
be picked up by a bus. Stayed in a house for 2 days. 80 people were there. And 
then were taken to Salmas in cars in groups of 2 people. We re-grouped in the 
mountains and crossed the Iranian-Turkish border on foot (migrant no. 69).  
 
The Iranian-Turkish mountainous border is crossed on foot in groups of 50-100 
people, from all three nationalitiesvii, at night usually escorted by two smuggler-
guides at a time (migrants no. 65, 67). Locals, Iranians and Kurdish, take over this leg 
of the journey which takes 12-15 hours. The perils of the Iran-Turkey border crossing 
are many. Local mafias kidnapping migrants asking for ransom from their relatives 
back home, police shooting in the dark and extreme weather conditions make up the 
ingredients for a very treacherous passage. Twelve people from H.’s convoy were 
caught by Kurdish mafia while they were crossing the Turkish Iranian mountainous 
border. As they told him when he met two of them in Athens months after that 
incident: 
 
They were telling them ‘call your home to bring money’. They were pulling 
out nails, cutting ears…they were talking with their dad and mum on the 
phone and he [the mafia guy] was screaming, he was cutting and they were 
screaming…(migrant no. 57).  
 
 
 
 
[ no more pages available]  
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Notes 
                                                     
i Data taken from Eurostat, see 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps0
0001, last accessed 13 July 2011. 
ii Data taken from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Resources/unitedstates.cfm, last 
accessed 13 July 2011. 
iii For the UNODC see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/smuggling-of-
migrants.html?ref=menuside and for IOM see: http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/748 ). 
iv The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, is the main international 
instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. It opened for signature by 
Member States at a High-level Political Conference convened for that purpose in Palermo, 
Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 and entered into force on 29 September 2003. The 
Convention is further supplemented by three Protocols, which target specific areas and 
manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. For more information see: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html , last accessed 10 July 2011. 
v Some are indeed hotels. In other cases, they are apartments or houses used for this purpose. 
vi http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SAFRON-
UNHCR+conduct+population+verification+survey+of+Afghans+in...-a0252594582, last 
accessed 26 July 2011. 
vii Although in one group one encounters migrants from different countries having deals with 
different smugglers, in the case of Pakistanis sometimes one finds a smuggled group 
consisting of Pakistani migrants only. 
